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RATIONING THE INF INITE
Leonard M. Niehoff*
M EDIA CONCENTRATION AND D EMOCRACY: W HY OWNERSHIP M ATTERS. By

C. Edwin Baker.

New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii,

256. Cloth, $68; paper, $23.99.
I NTRODUCTION
While in the course of reading the book reviewed here, I wandered into a
local coffee shop to supplement my morning dose of caffeine. I put the book
down so I could fish some money from my pocket. The young man behind
the counter tapped the cover with his finger and said, "Hey, great book."
This sort of remark captures a reviewer's attention, and so I asked, "Why do
you think so?" His initial deer-in-the-headlights expression gradually gave
way to something like self-confidence; he furrowed his brow and tightened
his lips and then responded, "The guy has lots of ideas."

'
And so he does. Over the past two decades, C. Edwin Baker has closely

considered the various forces that threaten the independence of the press and
its unique contribution to a free and democratic society. In

and Freedom of Speech,
mental

power threaten

2

Human Liberty

he discussed how abuses and excesses of govern
freedom

of expression

Advertising and a Democratic Press,3

and of the

press.

In

he explored how the press's depend

ence on advertising weakens the performance of the institution and distorts
the content of its publications. In

4
Media, Markets, and Democracy,

he in

vestigated the relationship between media economics and democratic theory.
Now, in his most recent book,

Ownership Matters,

Media Concentration and Democracy: Why

Baker considers how media ownership--particularly

the concentration of ownership--affects the ability of the press to fulfill its
charge under the First Amendment.

*
Adj unct Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School; Shareholder, Butzel
Long, P.C., Ann Arbor, Michigan. In the interest of full disclosure, I note that for more than twenty
years I have represented media entities, including two that were involved in the newspaper strike
depicted in the photograph on the cover of Professor Baker's book. Although my experience informs
my Review of this book, the opinions expressed here are solely my own. I thank Ronald K.L.
Collins, scholar, First Amendment Center, and Lee Levine, partner, Levine, Sullivan, Koch &
Schulz, Washington, D.C., for reviewing a draft of this Review. I also thank the editorial staff of the
Michigan Law Review, and particularly Cheryl Bratt, for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Responsibility for any omissions, oversights, or errant observations is of course entirely my own.
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i s divided into five chapters. In

the first chapter, Baker sets forth three arguments for the proposition that the
increasing concentration of media ownership compromises the role of a free
press within a democratic society and, therefore, requires a regulatory re
sponse. Part I of this Review describes those three arguments and contends
that, although they offer some inventive reconceptualizations of the relation
ship between media and democracy, they ultimately lack the theoretical
rigor and empirical substantiation necessary to justify significant changes in
media-ownership policy. In short, Part I maintains that B aker bears a burden
of proof and does not carry it.

In the next three chapters, B aker considers objections that might be

raised to his arguments. Part II of this Review questions whether B aker fair

ly frames those rebuttal arguments and whether he offers sufficient support

for his rejection of them. In particular, Part II challenges Baker's fairly dis
missive view of the impact that new media, especially as conveyed through
the internet, may have on the very issue his book seeks to address.
In his final chapter, Baker proposes possible policy responses to the
problems created by media concentration. Part III of this Review explores
the various shortcomings of these proposals. Part III focuses on some appar
ent inconsistencies within Baker's arguments and highlights the absence of
the practical details needed to effect-or even evaluate-the changes he
proposes.
As this summary suggests, this Review raises a number of objections to
B aker's arguments and proposals. Furthermore, this Review raises the fun
damental question of whether Baker's central operating assumption-that
media is a scarce resource that should be fairly distributed-remains timely
in light of the far-reaching and fast-paced changes wrought by the internet.
Nevertheless, this Review also recognizes that, as with B aker's prior works,

Media Concentration and Democracy

makes a serious contribution to the

discussion of the political, social, and economic dynamics that challenge the
existence of a strong and independent media.

Democracy

Media Concentration and

does a better job of raising questions than of answering them,

but this does not prevent it from adding meaningfully to the debate sur
rounding these issues.
I. BAKER'S THREE REASONS FOR OPPOSING MEDIA OWNERSHIP
CONCENTRATION: ARGUING FROM POWER, PROCESS, AND PREDICTION

In Chapter One, Baker describes what he sees as "the three main reasons

for opposing ownership concentration."5 His first reason rests on a "norma
tive

conception

of democracy"

in

which

political

power

is equally

distributed (p. 6). Baker invokes the "one-person/one-vote institutional

5. P. 6. Baker identifies a number of other reasons as well. For example, he argues that
conglomerates are particularly vulnerable to outside pressures and internal conflicts of interest. Pp.
37-4 1 . This Review focuses on the three arguments Baker identifies as central to his claims about
ownership concentration.

Rationing the Infinite

April 2009]

1 02 1

principle" as a familiar expression of this concept, and suggests that com
municative power should be distributed in a similarly egalitarian manner. 6
His second argument contends that media dispersal is necessary to check
governmental authority and protect society from its abuse (pp. 16-19). His
third reason is that evenly dispersed media ownership produces higher qual

ity journalism (pp. 28-37). Although Baker's rationales merit consideration,

I believe he does an inadequate job of defending them, both theoretically
and empirically.
A.

Baker 's Three Reasons

Baker's first argument for promoting media distribution is based in a
concept of normative democracy and what Baker calls "communicative
power," by which he means the power to convey preferences, views, and
visions and thereby shape public opinion (p. 7). Baker argues that, "[a]s ap

plied to media ownership,

this

[democratic distribution

principle for

communicative power] can be plausibly interpreted structurally as requiring

. . . a maximum dispersal of media ownership" (p. 7). Baker concedes that

this argument finds its support not in empirical evidence but in normative
appeal (p. 8). B ut this does not trouble him because he believes that the
normative force of this principle makes it a free-standing basis to oppose
ownership concentration: "the democratic distribution principle is always a
proper, whether or not a conclusive, reason to oppose concentration and fa
vor media ownership dispersal" (p. 10).

B aker alternatively frames the "democratic distribution principle" as an

"inclusionary goal" (p. 1 1). He contends that "[o]wnership should be dis
tributed in a manner that results in no one feeling that discourses of groups
with which she identifies are neglected or subordinated" (p. 11). He main

tains that "all groups should have a real share and no one group or
individual should have too inordinate a share of media power" (p. I 1). And

he posits that "[t]his goal is typically furthered by maximum dispersal of
ownership" (p. 11).
Baker's second argument is that dispersal of media ownership prevents
the exercise of "enormous, unequal and hence undemocratic, largely un
checked, potentially irresponsible power" (p.

16). He notes that our

constitutional structure establishes a separation of powers to reduce the risk
of abuses by the government (p. 16). He argues the same considerations ap
ply with respect to the structure of the fourth estate: "[t]he widest possible

dispersal of media power reduces the risk of the abuse of communicative
7
power in choosing or controlling the government." As with his egalitarian
distribution

argument,

he

describes

the

significance

of

this

6. P. 6. B aker acknowledges that conception and reality differ, and that many factors result
in the unequal distribution of political power. P. 6.
7. P. 16. Baker compares this normative impulse supporting media dispersal with that sup
porting campaign finance reform, arguing that in both cases the goal is "to prevent one person or a
small group from being able to use the power of wealth to dominate the (electoral) public sphere." P.
1 7.
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approach by reference to process, "independent of any commodity that the
media produces and distributes on a day-to-day basis" (p. 16). And, as with
his egalitarian distribution argument, he does not rely upon empirical evi
dence but rather declares that the danger he describes "is a simple matter of
8
logic."
Baker's third argument is that large media conglomerates, particularly
publicly traded ones, are inclined both to focus on profit making, and to do
so at the expense of investment in "news and other cultural media content
that people want and citizens need" (p. 29). In other words, he claims that
ownership concentration results in a decline in content quality. Baker bases
this claim on what he calls "sociologically and structurally based predic
tions" (p. 29).
One such prediction is that executives at large media companies will
seek to maximize profits because that is the primary basis on which they are
rewarded (p. 33). Baker argues this is particularly true when those running
media corporations are not themselves journalists (p. 33). Baker contrasts
these executives with the heads or owners of smaller entities, who he says
are "likely to identify more often with the quality of their firm's journalistic
efforts and the paper or station's service to their communities" (p. 34).
Another prediction is that corporations that acquire other businesses will
seek to maximize profits in order to cover the debt created by the purchase
and to make the merger decision appear wise (p. 35). Baker believes some
empirical evidence supports these predictions, though he candidly describes
it as "limited and messy" (p. 35). "Still," he maintains, "the most obvious
plot line is: publicly traded companies fire journalists, degrade quality, and
increase profits" (p. 36).
Baker's reasons for opposing media ownership thus share two related
characteristics: they rest on arguments from theory and logic, and they dis
count the significance of empirical data. This approach causes problems for
Baker. Readers may not share his dismissive view of the relevancy of em
pirical evidence to the questions at hand. And, perhaps more importantly,
B aker's approach shifts the burden of his argument to his theoretical con
structs, which do not hold up particularly well under close scrutiny.
B. A Critique of Pure Reasons: Failings of Theory and Evidence
Baker's first argument, regarding normative democratic values, has
some appeal, but it is not adequately developed or defended. Surely most
people would agree that inclusion represents a democratic value. But, as
B aker notes, so does the familiar principle that our democracy should foster
9
Baker aptly
free competition within the marketplace of ideas.
8. P. 1 9. Although Baker does not base his argument on empirical data, he does cite in
stances in German and Italian history where the conglomeration of media power significantly aided
the ascendancy of a favored political figure. P. 1 8.
9. The model of the marketplace of ideas, in which truth and falsity are allowed to compete
with the expectation that the former will ordinarily prevail, has a distinguished intellectual history.
The theme is reflected in JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITJCA (London, 1 644), JOHN LocKE, A LEITER
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describes the driving rationale (or, as he labels it, the "epistemological
hope") behind the marketplace of ideas model: "those speakers with better
arguments will prevail over those without," a notion that "presumably re
quires that these better arguments ultimately gather larger audiences" (p.
11). Of course, this value of free competition within the marketplace con
flicts with the value of inclusion-at least insofar as the former will result in
the marginalization, if not the elimination, of some views and opinions. If,
as Baker seems to believe, the value of inclusion trumps the value of a free
wheeling and largely unregulated market, then he needs to adequately ex
plain why and to what extent this is so.
Baker makes an effort to offer such an explanation in his second chapter.
His argument rests largely on the rejection of the marketplace of ideas
model as naive and misguided. He contends that "[t]he view that the unregu
lated marketplace of ideas can be expected to arrive at anything reasonably
treated as 'truth' is simply implausible unless the result, whatever it is, is
simply defined as 'truth' by fiat-that is, because it resulted from this proc
ess" (pp. 84-85). He argues that "[o]nly misguided premises concerning the
objectivity of truth, combined with extreme assumptions about the extent of
human rationality, would justify a belief in the routine superiority of an un
regulated marketplace of ideas for the purposes of reaching truth" (p. 85).
I share some of B aker's skepticism about the marketplace of ideas mod
el. Still, this part of B aker's argument seems to build up a straw man just to
knock it down. Certainly, the marketplace of ideas model depends upon a
broadly descriptive and necessarily imprecise metaphor. And, certainly, it is
easy to think of instances where the marketplace has failed us and bad ideas
have prevailed over better ones. But these shortcomings pale in comparison
to the mischief wrought by conceptual models that have allowed for gov
ernmental regulation of ideas and their expression. The question, therefore,
is not whether the marketplace of ideas model is perfect and consistently
right; rather, the question is whether that model is less imperfect than mod
els that allow for greater governmental power over the media. B aker does
not frame the question correctly, and his answer suffers accordingly.
Furthermore, Baker's opposition to the marketplace of ideas model de
pends upon a shift in orientation that is easy to miss but deeply problematic.
In rejecting the marketplace of ideas, B aker uses language with a heavily
egalitarian sensibility, which naturally evokes sympathy. He repeatedly al
ludes to the interest in having "all people," "all groups," and "any part of
society" heard (p. 11). He notes that " [u]seful challenges" to the accepted
wisdom "usually come from the margins" (p. 11). But his argument evokes
less sympathy, indeed seems patently flawed, if we turn the focus away from
CONCERNING TOLERATION (London, Awnsham Churchill 1 689), and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIB
ERTY (London, J.W. Parker & Son 1 859). Its most famous expression i n American law comes in
Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, where he declared that "the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." 250 U.S. 6 1 6, 630
( 1 9 19) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For a general history of the model, see T. BARTON CARTER ET AL,
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF MASS MEDIA 38-43 ( 1 0th ed.
2008). For a close and critical analysis of the shortcomings of the model, see FREDERICK SCHAUER,
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPffiCAL ENQUIRY 1 9-30 ( 1 982).
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people and back to ideas. Some ideas-such as Holocaust denial, slavery,
the inherent weakness of women, and the inferiority of racial minorities
have been pushed to the margins by informed public discourse, and we do
not mourn this development as a form of disenfranchisement. A marketplace
of ideas that embraces everything and results in the marginalization of noth
ing offers little promise of progress.
But, even if we accept Baker's focus on people rather than ideas, his ar
gument comes up wanting because he does not explain how his conclusion
follows from his premise. Media-ownership dispersal may result in the in
clusion of voices that would otherwise be excluded; or it may not.
Ownership dispersal and the inclusion of diverse voices are in fact logically
distinct, and while numerically increased distribution and inclusion are not
io
unrelated, the latter certainly does not necessarily follow from the former.
Whether ownership dispersal creates inclusion depends on an array of
factual considerations with which B aker declines to engage in any depth.
For example, economic and other barriers to entry may prevent certain
groups from participating in ownership even if ownership is dispersed. Bak
er appears to admit as much when he acknowledges that dispersal does not
"guarantee" the "experience of inclusion" (p. 12). Still, Baker thinks it suffi
cient that dispersal will "more likely" have this result than concentration;
the policy, he observes, thus stands on an "expectation" (p. 12). It seems far
from obvious, however, that dispersal justifies even something as limited as
an expectation. After all, if barriers to entry prohibit or limit the participa
tion of certain groups in ownership-and there are good reasons to believe
this is the case-then dispersal will in and of itself do nothing to remove
those barriers. A group excluded by economic barriers will find little solace
11
in the availability of more media outlets they cannot afford to purchase.
Furthermore, even if we accept Baker's conclusion-that dispersal of
ownership will make a "probable contribution . . . to inclusion" (p. 12)-this
leaves open the question of whether that salutary effect justifies the price
exacted. This seems unanswerable in the abstract, which is where Baker
wishes to address the issue. Granted, a "probable contribution" may suffice
to tip the scales if one subscribes to the principle that in all (or most) cases a
prohibition of media-ownership concentration will impose little or no bur
den on democratic values. But reasonable people can reject such a principle
or, at least, demand empirical data to substantiate it. For example, a reason
able person might believe that a given concentration of media ownership

1 0. An analogy helps make this clear. Assume, for example, that a highly competitive uni
versity graduate program receives I 0,000 applications for one hundred spots. Even if the university
were to increase the number of available spots by several hundred percent, doing so would not nec
essarily assure the inclusion of all the various groups the university would like to see represented in
its class. Certainly, an increase in the number of spots will result in a larger class; but, as a result of
significant differences in the pool sizes of various applicant groups, it may also result in a collection
of students that looks virtually identical to the smaller class.
1 1 . Whether this holds true depends, of course, on the groups at issue and the factors that
allow them to participate or preclude them from participating in ownership. Curiously. however,
Baker maintains that his argument allows him to sidestep this complex collection of questions. P. 1 2.
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would preserve or promote foreign bureaus, investigative-reporting teams,
12
and other resource-intensive activities.
Baker acknowledges that ownership dispersal may not lead to a diversity
of content and viewpoint (p. 15). But he dismisses this concern as reflecting
a "commodity-oriented perspective" that "miss[es] the point about why de
mocracy requires diversity" (p. 15). Democracy, he argues, is invested in a
notion of process that allows for egalitarian participation; " [it] does not,
however, require that speakers provide or listeners choose a maximum (or
any particular, high level ot) diversity in commodity content" (p. 1 6).
At this point, however, Baker's argument for wider ownership distribu
tion for the sake of wider ownership distribution seems to take on more
weight than it can possibly bear. As noted above, wider ownership distribu
tion-and the corresponding possibility of more diverse participation-may
be worth something. But if we do not believe that such distribution will ac
tually result in the participation of marginalized groups, or in the expression
of diverse perspectives, then its value seems extraordinarily limited. Indeed,
a critic could accuse such a celebration of wider ownership distribution as
the worst kind of capitalist hypocrisy, on one hand exclaiming the virtues of
inclusion and on the other hand disclaiming any likelihood of achieving the
kinds of inclusion that matter.
Baker's argument might survive these criticisms if he described the goal
of inclusion as a salient consideration and made limited claims for it. In
stead, he identifies this as "possibly the single most important[] reason to
favor [ownership] dispersal" (p. 1 2). And he argues that "this democratic
distributive value, without any need for complicated empirical investigations
or controversial economic analyses, provides an entirely proper reason to
oppose any particular media merger or to favor any policy designed to in
crease the number or diversity of separate owners of media entities" (p. 13).
This is an ambitious claim indeed for a value that conflicts with other rec
ognized democratic values (such as liberty and selection within the
marketplace of ideas) and that, as a factual matter, may or may not be served
13
by an antagonism toward media-ownership concentration.
Baker's second argument, which contends that media dispersal helps
guard democracy and prevent the abuse of governmental power (p. 1 6),
again requires us to think about this issue without engaging in any
searches--or, as he sees it, "misguided search[es]"-"for empirical evi
dence" (p. 20; emphasis added). Baker grudgingly concedes that
14
"sometimes" empirical information is relevant, but he argues for a very
1 2.

Indeed, Baker himself seems to acknowledge such possibilities later in his book. See p.

1 79.
1 3. Oddly, Baker seems to retreat from this argument as soon as he makes it. He goes on to
say, "The important caveat . . . is that countervail ing considerations can contextually provide a basis
to override this normative reason for dispersal." P. 1 3 . If that is so, however, then what does it mean
to say that this normative principle provides a basis to oppose all concentrations and support all
dispersals?
1 4. P. 20. Baker outlines "six cautions about the use of positivist social science research." P.
20. These are essentially warnings about the ways in which efforts to detennine empirically the
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narrow understanding o f the possible utility of such information with re
spect to this issue.
Baker contends that "some issues are centrally a matter of values" and
that "[ w ]hen this is the case [then] the relevance of factual information is
limited" (p. 20). Here, he returns to his comparison of the value of owner
ship dispersal with the value of one-person/one-vote, noting that the "the
basic issues, the basic controversies" with respect to the latter, "were norma
tive, not factual" (pp. 20-21). In my view, however, this simply
demonstrates one of the principal problems with relying on this comparison.
After all, we do not start from an assumption that elections are a free
wheeling marketplace in which some people will accumulate the power to
cast more votes than other people. The principle of one-person/one-vote
therefore does not exist in tension with a competing democratic value.
On the other hand, we do commonly start from an assumption that free
dom of expression is a largely unregulated enterprise where some voices
will accumulate more authority than others. Indeed, without such power and
acceptance, good ideas could not prevail over bad ones, and speech could
not check the power of the government. As noted above, limiting a speaker's
ability to accumulate power within the marketplace would be in serious ten
sion with this value. B aker solves this difficulty by concluding that one
value simply trumps the other. But another, and perhaps more coherent, way
of solving it is to try to determine the respective costs and benefits and to
make a judgment based on the weight of the evidence. The great weight of
historical evidence militates against allowing governmental control over the
media-this is, after all, the stuff of such constitutionally obnoxious prac
tices as licensing of the press. A strong presumption therefore exists against
efforts to impose such control, and those who advocate for such control bear
the heavy burden of coming forward with persuasive empirical evidence to
justify departing from the norm. Baker does not just fail to offer such evi
dence; he denies any need for it.
Baker's last argument, that media dispersal enhances media quality (pp.
28-37), also suffers from several difficulties, one of which is perhaps most
striking. Baker seems here to assume that the predicted compromise in qual
ity clearly rises to a level that justifies the prevention of the activity that
1
caused it. 5 This may hold true, or it may not. A marginal sacrifice in quality
that results in a robust enterprise able to weather economic downturns may
not strike us as an undesirable tradeoff. So citing a degradation of quality
even if true-raises a question about the balance of interests but does not

effects of media concentration can go astray. Ultimately, however, Baker acknowledges that "[t]hese
six cautions should not be read as a basis for rejecting the relevance of empirical evidence." P. 26.
Rather, these considerations simply "counsel caution" about the use of empirical evidence in this
context. P. 26.
1 5 . Pp. 36-37. At the risk of stating the obvious, this argument must focus on the question of
quality. After all, profit maximization is not inherently undesirable-<>r, at least, Baker has not
shown it to be so.
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answer it. 1 6 As discussed above, this conceptual mistake recurs throughout
Baker's first chapter.
II. R EBUTTING THE REBUTTAL:
'
A C RITIQUE OF B AKER S A NSWERS TO A NTICIPATED O BJECTIONS
Some have argued that concentration of media ownership offers impor
tant benefits, such as efficiencies that allow for cheaper prices or more
consumer choice, higher capacity to remain independent and resist outside
pressures, greater resources to finance expensive investigative reporting and
litigation, and so on (pp. 49-53). Baker expresses doubt about these argu
ments

but

acknowledges

that

they

ultimately

tum

on

empirical

determinations and so cannot be dismissed out of hand (pp. 52-53). Baker
instead chooses to spend most of his energies on arguments holding that
media concentration does not pose a threat requiring a solution.
Baker therefore engages with arguments that media concentration is
overstated and largely ignores arguments that the benefits of such concentra
tion outweigh the costs. This approach results in two serious problems for
his thesis. First, Baker's failure to contend with the facially credible
counterargument that significant benefits may flow from ownership concen
tration necessarily renders his own argument incomplete. Second, by
focusing his energies in this way, he shifts the burden of his argument to his
contention that concentration of media ownership is a serious problem de
manding a serious remedy. Among other things, this means that Baker must
offer a convincing explanation as to why the existence of new media does
not fundamentally change the way we should think about communicative
power and its concentration. In my view, he does not.
A.

Negative Critique Without Positive Counterargument

The first argument Baker addresses holds that the media industry is
highly competitive and not unduly concentrated, a position championed by
economist B enjamin Compaine (p. 54). Baker makes some useful points
about this argument, particularly regarding the importance of appropriately
defining "the media" before attempting to evaluate its concentration. Still,
B aker's critique ultimately seems ungrounded and academic.
B aker notes that the data supporting media concentration relate to "the

media as a whole,"

improperly combining "content producers, content de

livery companies, content packagers, and retailers" as one "market."1 7 In
addition, he points out that this argument defines undue concentration by
reference to Chicago School antitrust standards (p. 59). He contends that

1 6 . As noted, this is only one issue that might be raised in response to Baker's argument.
Others plainly exist, such as exploring the difficulties inherent in defining quality with respect to
speech.
1 7 . Pp. 58-59. As Baker observed, "[o]bviously, the broader the market, the less likely that
objectionable concentration will be found." P. 59; see also pp. 60-64.
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those standards, which focus on whether a merger results in an entity with
the power to control price and whether a merger serves economic efficiency,
do not suffice as a substitute for a rich and complex analysis of the political
and social values at stake here. 18 And he maintains that even a broader un
derstanding of antitrust law and economics would still fail to capture the

unique considerations at issue in the media context. 19 With respect to the last
two points, B aker returns to the theme that a commodity-oriented approach
to the question of media concentration (such as an approach based on anti
trust economics) ignores the most salient considerations at issue-including
the three non-commodity-oriented reasons for opposing such concentration
that he champions earlier in his book (p. 75).
Baker makes his points forcefully, and I share his skepticism about eco
nomics as a proxy for normative policy making. Still, the impulse to
evaluate the effects of media concentration by reference to settled and mea

surable standards-while acknowledging that they may fail to account for
some softer values we would ideally incorporate into our analysis-has
some allure. Indeed, B aker inadvertently makes j ust this point when he lists
the types of questions he says antitrust analysis fails to address, such as "[i]s
media's communicative power distributed in ways that are democratically
fair?" and "[i]s it distributed in ways likely to lead to better and safer politi
cal and social processes . . . ?" (p. 75). Readers may agree with B aker that
the Chicago School approach seems unsatisfactorily crabbed and simplistic,
but they may also conclude that his own approach seems hopelessly vague
and abstract.

Furthermore, readers may believe that B aker has contented himself with

doing the easy work of launching a negative critique without doing the hard
work of offering positive proof. If B aker believes that significant and dan
gerous media concentration exists, then he must prove it. Of course, this
would require him to engage in the preliminary project of appropriately de
fining the media, just as he requires of Compaine. Such an undertaking,

however, would compel B aker to acknowledge the place of new media in
the current distribution of communicative power. Rather than contending
with this challenge, offering his own definition of media, and then marshal
ing data to show that media ownership concentration exists, Baker limits
himself to an attack on Compaine's model. This may strike readers as an
evasion. And this is particularly true for readers who harbor the suspicion
that the existence of new media undercuts Baker's scarcity-based arguments
in ways he either does not understand or prefers to avoid discussing. Regret
tably, B aker's next point reinforces this suspicion.
B.

Contending with New Media

Baker next addresses the argument that media concentration does not,
indeed cannot, result in disproportionate power because of the internet (p.
1 8.

P. 59; see also pp. 65-72.

1 9.

P. 59; see also pp. 72-76.
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97). Some scholars have maintained that the internet has lowered or elimi
nated economic barriers to the expansive distribution of information and to

competition in the media marketplace. 20 Baker acknowledges that "[t]he
internet undoubtedly has transformative effects on the public sphere that
potentially-or already-have great political and democratic significance"
(p. 98). Still, he suggests that "these particular developments have no bear
ing on any debate about the dangers or objections to media ownership
concentration" (p. 99), and he raises both empirical and theoretical argu
ments in support of his position.
B aker argues that the evidence does not support the conclusion that the
internet has meaningfully increased competition within media. He maintains
that "traditional news and cultural media continue to dominate . . . in per
forming (even if inadequately) their traditional roles" (p. 100). Further, he

notes that "[m]ost of the most heavily used news sites turn out to be owned
by offline brands and seldom add significant new journalistic resources" (p.

1 1 2). And he contends that high levels of audience concentration continue to
occur-and continue to increase-within the universe of nontraditional in
ternet content providers, such as biogs. In other words, despite the vast
choices offered by the internet, most people gravitate toward a fairly limited
number of sites (pp. 106-1 1 ) .
The difficulty with Baker's empirical analysis is one he acknowledges

and for which he cannot be faulted: things change quickly in the online

world. Thus, after reciting some data about blogging, Baker observes that
his numbers will surely be out of date by time they are read (p. 1 06). And
after explaining why the evidence suggests that the internet actually concen

trates public attention on communications provided by a few owners, Baker
concedes that, "[o]f course, all this could change" (p. 1 1 3). The fragility of

the existing empirical data prompts Baker to put aside the question of
whether the internet decreases or increases concentration and to ask instead
whether it alleviates "the

reasons

to be concerned about concentration" (p.

1 1 3). Baker concludes it does not.
Baker ingeniously-some might maintain

too

ingeniously-argues that

the success of online news providers may actually exacerbate the problems

inherent in media concentration. Baker points out that if internet news sites
generate less revenue than traditional media, then a consumer shift to online
news would reduce the resources available to support "serious commercial
journalism" (p. 1 1 6). Furthermore, Baker contends, "there is little reason to
think that in the near term . . . the new noncommercial, volunteer-supported
online news ventures will provide an adequate substitute for traditional pro
fessional journalism" (p.

1 1 9). Finally, Baker argues that "despite the

changes wrought by the internet, a small handful of companies may con
tinue to supply most of the financial resources for journalism (or cultural
creation) and to control most of the audience attention" (p. 1 2 1). Baker thus
finds that the existence of the internet does not eliminate the evils he sees in

20. See, e.g., BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?:
COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY (3d ed. 2000).
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media-ownership concentration-an undemocratic imbalance of expressive
power and a decline in quality reporting-are not eliminated (or even mean
ingfully reduced). He therefore dismisses the "misguided invocation of the
internet as a total solution to . . . the problem of concentration" as faddish
and intellectually sloppy (p. 1 23).
At this point, however, a number of tensions seem to emerge within
B aker's text. The book begins by invoking the importance of the democratic
distribution of communicative power, but Baker's discussion of the most
powerfully democratizing distribution system in the history of the planet has
a decidedly, almost absurdly, dismissive quality. The book rejects antitrust
analysis and all other brands of "commodity" thinking about speech, but
B aker's embrace of traditional journalistic quality may strike the reader as
elitist and heavily commodity oriented. The book acknowledges the empiri
cal uncertainty about the current effects and future impact of the internet,
but Baker seems to express his conclusions in a much more strident and
confident manner than such a context would suggest is appropriate. Baker
also has a larger problem: most readers of this book will have some famili
arity with the anguish newspaper publishers have expressed over their
declining circulation numbers and loss of audience to the internet. It seems
early in the day to predict what all this means, but it seems late in the day to
maintain that nontraditional internet content does not pose a serious com
petitive challenge to traditional media.
It is at this point that I believe B aker's book loses a great deal of its per
suasive force and credibility. Baker's entire argument necessarily rests on
the proposition that a problem exists that is sufficiently definable, signifi
cant, and persistent to warrant a substantial change in policy. But the
internet and the new modes of communication that flow through it put all of
this into play. In the current situation, even the basic task of defining the
media poses profound challenges. Assessing the existence and significance
of concentration becomes a daunting, perhaps impossible, task. And at
tempting to formulate policy aimed at such a rapidly moving target seems
quixotic and ill-advised. The reader may be left with the impression that
Baker's book either comes too late, because the scarcity-based media model
he employs has become a quaint memory, or too early, because we do not
yet understand the impact of the internet on the issue of media-ownership
concentration. In either event, readers are likely to conclude that the time is
out of joint for B aker's thesis.
C.

Regulation in the Interest of Freedom

In the fourth chapter of his book, B aker seeks to rebut claims that the
regulation of media ownership conflicts with the constitutional protection
afforded freedom of speech. He bases his rebuttal on two main points: ( 1 )
that the ultimate beneficiary of press freedom should b e the general public,
not media owners, and (2) that governmental restrictions on media owner-
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21
ship facilitate, rather than undermine, the aims of the First Amendment.
But Baker's arguments do not withstand analysis. Courts do not draw a clear
dividing line between First Amendment protection for media owners and
protection for others, nor should they. Furthermore, it seems odd to suggest
that allowing the government a greater hand in restricting the media will
somehow facilitate media freedom-particularly the freedom to criticize the
government. In advancing his theory of the First Amendment, B aker asks
the reader to join him in a collection of views and assumptions that seem
debatable at best.
1 . Media Owners as Beneficiaries of First A mendment Protection
Baker first argues that, while constitutional rights are commonly under
stood as existing to benefit the individual rights holder, the appeal of this
approach breaks down in the case of media entities (pp. 1 30-3 1 ). He con
tends that "[i]t is a logical mistake . . . to treat [a] press entity-the overt
rights holder-as [we would treat] an individual" because "[a]ttributing ul
timate or inherent moral significance to legal structures-to institutions-is,
at best, perverse" (p. 1 3 1 ) . Baker maintains that it makes no sense to restrain
ourselves from making policy choices that "further the collective welfare" in
order to benefit "legally created institutions whose significance presumably
lies in the service of society" (p. 1 3 1 ).
To support his argument, Baker distinguishes individual freedom from
press freedom. In B aker's view, the former seeks to benefit the individual
rights holder by providing her or him with a sphere of expressive liberty
inviolate from governmental interference. This freedom is an end in itself
(pp. 1 30, 1 33). The latter, in contrast, seek to preserve the media's instru
mental and structural role as the fourth estate-the institution within our
democracy that persuades, struggles against, and exposes the "other
branches" (p. 1 32). This freedom is a means to other ends. As such, he ar
gues, press freedom should be subject to regulation (such as ownership
restrictions) that facilitates its functional role (pp. 1 3 1-38).
Baker's argument is interesting but unsatisfying for several reasons.
First, the bright line B aker attempts to draw between individual and press
freedom does not map to reality. Baker classifies individuals as those with
moral significance and press entities as those without. But the speech of
media entities, like the speech of individuals, reflects exercises of moral
.
22
JU dgment.
Indeed, media entities commonly take positions regarding, and wield
immense influence concerning, the critical moral issues of our day. Casting
these voices as impersonal abstractions certainly makes regulation seem
2 1 . Pp. 1 27-28. Baker further maintains that this second premise makes sense only in con
nection with a third, i.e., that judges should be active in reviewing and second guessing political
judgments about the proper structure of the media industry.
22. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 4 1 8 U.S. 241 ( 1 974), can be read to support
this proposition. Baker argues that the Court's decision in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 5 1 2
U.S. 622 ( 1 994), repudiates any such interpretation. Pp. 1 35-37.
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more palatable-an instinct Baker feeds by alluding to telephone compa
nies, cable systems, and expansive media entities like Time Warner, News
Corporation, and Clear Channel (p . 1 30). But his approach seems less ap
pealing if we think instead of the New Yorker, the National Review,
Commentary, the Christian Century, the publications of the Sierra Club and
the Audubon Society, or the editorial pages of the New York Times and the

Wall Street Journal.
In this respect, Baker's approach may remind the reader of the stubborn
but largely unworkable distinction between commercial and non
commercial speech. The Supreme Court's attempt to separate speech into
these two categories, and to assign differing values to those categories, has
resulted in a jurisprudence of conspicuous incoherence. Baker's effort to
divide speakers into two categories, and to assign them distinctive roles and
differing protections based on that categorization, appears no better able to
accommodate the inconvenient messiness of how the world actually works.
Even if we accept the distinction, problems remain. After all, the press
has the ability to check governmental power-that is, to serve its instrumen
tal and structural role-primarily because of its independence and freedom.
Yet Baker argues for greater governmental control over the media-indeed,
over nothing less than the critical issue of ownership. And, perhaps even
more curiously, Baker contends that the government would exercise this
control by fostering policies that would better position the media to struggle
against and expose the government's own failings. It seems at least as plau
sible that the goal of media independence from government would be best
served by media independence from government.
2. Government Regulation ofMedia Owners and the First Amendment
Baker next turns to his argument that restricting media ownership does
not undermine the aims of the First Amendment. Returning to his earlier
themes, Baker again discounts what he describes as the commodity-oriented
metaphor of the marketplace of ideas, where the aim of the First Amend
ment is to avoid laws that "reduce the quantity, quality, and diversity of
speech" (p. 143). This metaphor, B aker reiterates, "simply does not engage
the democratic values underlying press freedom" (p. 145).
This leads B aker into a consideration of various theories of democracy
(pp. 146-47), each of which, he acknowledges, "has different implications
for the democratic rationale for press freedom and for the constitutionality
or desirability of restricting ownership concentration" (p . 147). Without
much discussion, Baker embraces what he labels as a theory of "complex
23
democracy," which he says cannot resolve "on principle" questions "about

23. Baker defines "complex democracy" to mean democracy that "involves a complex mix
ture of republican and liberal discourses." P. 1 46. His concept of complex democracy also
"emphasizes the importance of subgroups' cultural, self-definitional discourses, as well as strategic
discourses internal to subgroups." P. 147.
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24
the ideal amount and content of regulation" of media concentration. He
maintains that because these questions are heavily empirical, and thus "no
clear abstract (constitutional) principle[]" can determine which policies are
best, courts should leave them to legislative judgments (p. 148). B aker thus
seems to argue that the First Amendment has nothing to say about limita
tions on press ownership.
I respect the ambitious breadth of Baker's vision, but I think he asks a
great deal of the reader here. As I understand it, the analytic steps proceed as
follows:
We must accept the proposition that the Constitution guarantees press
freedom in order to achieve structural and instrumental aims-but is indif
ferent to the "quantity, quality, and diversity of speech" (p. 143). This poses
two challenges. First, we must think it is necessary to choose between these
two sets of values rather than embracing them both. Second, we must reject
a marketplace of ideas model that has a long tradition, intuitive appeal, and
25
at 1east some support m precedent.
Next, we must favor a model of complex democracy over all others
and we must do so on the strength of two pages of analysis of the competing
visions. And then we must accept the proposition that, because the chosen
democratic model does not yield a principle that dictates "the ideal amount
and content of regulation" (p. 148), concentration of media ownership does
not raise a question of constitutional significance and should be left to legis
lative judgments. The last step, which appears to imply that when the
Constitution cannot speak precisely it does not speak at all, may strike the
reader as particularly puzzling.
Baker's book has considerable richness and density here. His argument
is challenging, and I readily acknowledge I may have failed to follow it suc
cessfully. Still, it seems fair to observe that Baker demands more of his
audience than his argument requires. It would appear that all Baker really
needs to establish is that the sorts of ownership regulations he thinks advis
able do not raise constitutional concerns. That, of course, requires him to
offer a set of specific policy recommendations, which leads us to his final
chapters.
.

24. P. 1 48. In Chapter Five of his book, Baker states that "[C]hapter 4 emphasizes a theory of
complex democracy that had been only marginally discussed in [C]hapter I ." P. 1 63. Baker's desig
nation of complex democracy as a linchpin of his argument seems peculiar in light of the fact that
his discussion of it occupies only four paragraphs. Pp. 1 46-47. Readers might reasonably expect a
deeper and more robust discussion of why this theory, which plays such a central role in the argu
ment, deserves our allegiance.
25. This includes recent precedent. Consider, for example, the Court's decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In that case, the Court endorsed the principle that a university has a
compelling interest in admitting a diverse student body and can therefore consider the race of an
applicant as one of many factors in making admissions decisions. Although the case arose in a Four
teenth Amendment context, the Court's analysis of the compelling interest in question turns on the
model of the First Amendment that Baker seems to reject-a model that aims to achieve a market
place of ideas rich in quantity, quality, and diversity.
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Ill. B AKER ' S PROPOSED S OLUTIONS

In the final section of his book, Baker advances seven policy proposals,
which vary in their breadth and novelty (p. 1 63). In my view, this is the least
effective section of Baker's book, for two fundamental reasons. First, this
section assumes that Baker has established the existence of a serious prob
lem requiring serious solutions. For the reasons discussed above, however, I
do not believe he has done so. Certainly, the book fails to make the case em
pirically. Likewise, his theoretical arguments suffer from too many faults.
Second, if we assume that he has established the existence of such a prob
lem, then it is reasonable for us to expect that he will propose solutions that
will possess certain characteristics-for example, that they will be realistic,
that they will be specific enough to understand and evaluate, and that they
will be consistent with his diagnosis of the problem and with each other.
Unfortunately, Baker's proposed solutions do not meet these standards.
Baker begins by proposing a "somewhat different and more muscular
enforcement" of antitrust laws (p. 1 7 1). This seems an odd out-of-the-blocks
suggestion. After all, earlier in his book B aker argues that antitrust law does
not take account of the most significant issues raised by media-ownership
concentration-including his three non-commodity-oriented reasons for
opposing it. It is difficult to understand how the "more muscular" use of
such an allegedly ill-fitting legislative scheme would do much good or make
such sense. His joint call for a "somewhat different" approach to antitrust
law might compensate for this if it offered more specifics, but his argument
here amounts to a fairly vague urging of "media-specific regulation" (p.
1 72). Baker's candor in acknowledging that antitrust laws constitute an "in
sufficient response" (p. 1 73) makes the text somewhat more consistent, but
it does little to mitigate the sense that this is a strange place for him to start.
Baker's second proposal seems just as peculiar. Baker suggests
" [r]equiring pre-merger review, combined with media-specific conditions or
presumptions against approval, possibly carried out by two different agen
cies using different criteria" (p. 174). He observes that in the United States
26
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act already requires governmental pre-merger re
view of most large combinations (p. 1 73), and that some foreign countries
"impose a special, stricter review process or . . . apply different analyses in
the media context" (p. 1 74).
Still, Baker notes that these pre-merger laws have accomplished little
by which he means they have precluded very few ownership changes (p.
1 74). He suggests that the reason may be that these laws tend to leave con
siderable discretion in the hands of governmental officials, and exercises of
discretion are subject to manipulation (pp. 1 74-75). He therefore raises the
possibility that the adoption of "clear standards that embody a strong pre
sumption against mergers could increase the chances of obtaining
meaningful results" (p. 1 74).

26.

1 5 U.S.C. § 1 8(a) (2006).
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This proposal does not do much for Baker's argument. It seems vague
and speculative: it alludes to unarticulated "clear standards" and hypothe
sizes about what "could" follow from them if adopted. It also seems
halfhearted: the tone and word choice of this section of the book suggest
that Baker harbors considerable skepticism about the efficacy of this pro
posal. 27 Again, it will probably strike many readers as odd that Baker would
choose so ambiguous and tenuous a proposal as one of his "up front" policy
recommendations.
Baker's third proposal offers what he describes as an "ideal media mer
ger policy" (p. 1 78). He suggests that such a policy would be driven by two
principles: ( 1 ) media entities could be sold only to buyers who after the sale
would own no more media properties than the seller did before the sale, and
(2) any for-profit media entity buyer would have to receive the majority of
its post-purchase revenue from its media business (p. 178). This third pro
posal seems much more consistent with Baker's arguments than the first
two. It moves away from antitrust law and economics. And it moves toward
an absolute ban on any merger that would increase concentration of media
ownership or that would place media entities in the hands of non-media cor
porations.
But Baker cannot quite bring himself to stake out this extreme a posi
tion. He therefore acknowledges-grudgingly and skeptically-that such a
stringent rule might preclude some mergers that would "produce benefits for
the communications order and for the public" (p. 1 79). This leaves room for
the possibility that "an alternative might be to allow waivers . . . when the
applying purchaser can show clearly and concretely why allowing the pur
chase would benefit the public" (p. 1 79). B aker deserves credit for
recognizing that the specific facts of individual cases can play havoc with
bright-line rules. Nevertheless, his concession may trouble readers who be
lieve that waivers are subject to the same discretionary abuses B aker
28
identified in discussing his second proposal.
B aker's fourth proposal is that Congress should adopt a law that allows
the purchase of a media entity only if the continuing editorial independence
of that entity is guaranteed (p. 1 8 1 ). Baker here borrows an idea from the
29
Newspaper Preservation Act, under which newspapers that consolidate
their business operations must keep their editorial functions separate. And
he extends this principle-perhaps to the breaking point-by urging that the
proposed law should protect journalistic employees from dismissal except
for cause and should provide them with the power to veto dismissal of their
editor under most circumstances (p. 1 8 1).

27. For example, Baker cautions that "[t]he British and German experiences . . . warn against
expecting too much." P. 1 74.

28. Indeed, some readers may wonder whether Baker's argument has a kind of circularity to
it: we can embrace clear standards and bright-line rules because they will be subject to reasonable
exceptions; but we need not fear those exceptions because in applying them we will refer to clear
standards and bright-line rules.
29.

1 5 U.S.C. §§ 1 80 1 -1 804.
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Some will think this proposal does not go far enough. There is some
thing to this: the principle of editorial independence does not, in and of
itself, prevent many activities that may work against the democratic distribu
30
tion of communicative power. Others will think his proposal goes too far.
There is something to this as well: the legal and empirical support for this
approach seems thin, and Baker's invocation of such authorities as the Nor
wegian Press Association Code of Ethics does little to bolster his claim that
his suggestion is "not . . . unprecedented" (p. 1 8 1 ). Still others will object
that this proposal goes in the wrong direction-at least by Baker's own
reckoning. And there is something to this, too: it seems odd for Baker to rely
so heavily on a principle-editorial independence-that relates so closely to
such commodity-oriented notions as the quantity, quality, and diversity of
the voices that enter the marketplace of ideas.
Baker's fifth proposal is that "mergers or ownership changes could be
conditioned on approval by the journalistic, creative, and editorial employ
ees . . . of a media entity" (p. 1 82). He argues that, because such employees
would typically "oppose mergeres [sic] that they believe would degrade the
entities' journalistic or creative roles," the sales they approve would tend to
have positive, or at least neutral, effects on "the media order" (p. 1 82).
Baker acknowledges the objection that such a rule would take from the
owners and give to the employees "a potentially valuable right generally
connected with ownership" (p. 1 82). But Baker responds by pointing out
that this redistribution of power serves egalitarian ends as well as the inter
est in preserving media quality (p. 1 83).
Baker certainly casts his drama with starkly drawn actors. In this play,
owners care single-mindedly about profit margins and give no thought to
quality, while journalists deeply value their "creative roles" and would not
use their newly granted veto power to exact concessions that serve their per
sonal interests rather than those of "the media order" (pp. 1 77-78). Readers
may wonder whether these convenient bad-guy/good-guy role descriptions
have much to do with reality. I have represented media entities and journal
ists for more than twenty years and, in my experience, reality is
considerably more complicated.
Perhaps Baker is right---or at least right on average---or perhaps not.
What is certain is that he proposes to place an extraordinary burden on me
dia entities: he would deprive them of a common right of ownership and he
would impose on them a cost of doing business (a tax, if you will) that other
businesses do not bear. Curiously, he would do all this as a consequence of
the favored status of the media under our Constitution. Such extraordinary
measures call for extraordinarily powerful arguments and extraordinarily
compelling evidence. Readers may reasonably question whether Baker has
provided them. My own view is that he has not.
Baker's sixth and seventh proposals are his most vague. His sixth ad
vances the idea of subsidizing smaller media. He begins by noting that the
30. For example, editorial independence would not prevent one media entity from acquiring
another simply in order to shutter it and eliminate the competition.
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government subsidizes the media in a wide variety of ways, from granting
special postal rates to holding press conferences. He then argues that "de
mocratic theory clearly suggests the merits of considering tax benefits or
actual subsidies to support ownership diversity" (p. 1 85). Baker notes in
passing the potential for "greater estate tax exemptions [that] could favor
continuance of the remaining family media enterprises" (p. 1 86), and even
alludes to the possibility of "the government [providing] operating funds to
financially weaker [news]papers" (p. 1 86), but offers nothing more specific.
His seventh proposal advances the idea of imposing special responsibili
ties on large media firms. Again, he avoids specifics: "Special obligations
might be imposed on papers with market penetration levels above a certain
level" (p. 1 87). He mentions the possibility of " [r]equiring nondiscrimina
tory access to advertising space for views on matters of public importance"
(p. 1 88), but otherwise does not flesh out what he has in mind . In sum,
Baker's sixth and seventh proposals raises provocative ideas, but do so in
such a general manner that readers may conclude they do not have a firm
grasp on what he is proposing, let alone whether it makes any sense.
B aker describes his proposals as "gutsy," (p. 202) but readers may not
share this assessment. They are more likely to find some of his proposals
modest, some vague, and some ambitious and intriguing but insufficiently
supported. To Baker's credit, they are also likely to find many of his propos
als interesting invitations into further contemplation. In my opinion,
however, truly gutsy proposals would offer greater detail and would marshal
greater empirical support. Of course, that would make them more vulnerable
to questioning and counterargument, but then that's where the guts come in.
The inconsistencies, ambiguities, and uncertainties that haunt this sec
tion of the book are regrettable because they detract from the force of some
of the points that Baker makes earlier. Even those who accept Baker's ar
gument that media concentration exists and requires a remedy may feel
disappointed by his suggestions about how to address the problem. To bor
row a phrase from T.S. Eliot, this section ends the book not with a bang but
with a whimper, which disserves the provocative thinking that precedes it.
C ONCLUSION

In this Review, I have raised numerous objections, varying in their scope
and significance, to the arguments set forth in Baker's book. In my view,
however, the greatest failing of Media Concentration and Democracy is that
it does not engage broadly and deeply with the question of whether the de
velopment of new media has fundamentally changed the vehicles for the
communication of information-and thereby largely disposed of the very
problem B aker seeks to address. To the contrary, his treatment of new media
seems superficial, dismissive, and disconnected from the current realities of
communications dynamics.
This is such an important failing because so many of Baker's arguments
rest on explicit or implicit scarcity rationales. Indeed, a fair summary of his
central thesis would be that there are only so many media to go around, and
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we must therefore make sure they g o around fairly. The universe o f new
media-incompletely understood, explored, or even imagined-makes this
thesis seem dated. Indeed, the pervasive influence of new media will leave
some readers with the impression that B aker has set about the confused task
of attempting to ration an infinite resource. I think Baker's book never quite
recovers from this stumble. That is unfortunate, because in many other re
spects Media Concentration and Democracy is an intriguing and thought
provoking book.
31
In another intriguing and thought-provoking book, Robert McChesney
raises arguments that are in some respects similar to those raised by Baker
in Media Concentration and Democracy. And, in a review of McChesney's
32
book, Carlin Romano voices some of the same objections articulated here.
Still, Romano concludes his review by citing a passage from McChesney's
33
book and observing, "Over the top, sure, but it makes you think."
Baker's book deserves a rather similar assessment. At various moments
Media Concentration and Democracy is expansive, incremental, radical,
modest, straightforward, ambiguous, thoughtful, hopelessly abstract, deep,
superficial, under the radar, and over the top. Sure, but it makes you think.
Or, as the collegiate coffee-slinger so aptly put it, "The guy has a lot of
ideas." Some readers will find that enough. Others may wish for a good deal
more.

3 1 . ROBERT MCCHESNEY, COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION: CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND THE
FUTURE OF MEDIA (2007).
32. Carlin Romano, Big Fish and Small Fry, CoLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Jan.-Feb. 2008, at
47 (reviewing ROBERT MCCHESNEY, COMMUNICATION REVOLUTION: CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND
THE FUTURE OF MEDIA (2007)).
33.

Id. at 50.

